Notes for 11/13/2025

 

11/13/2025

[Philosophy Club every Tuesday at 5:00pm in CAS 436 ("The Cave")]

[Challenge for today: Try to think of (and possibly ask) at least one question.]

 

Would you consider yourself more “spiritual”, “religious”, or “neither”?

 

 

 

Roughly 1 in 4 people identify as "spiritual but not religious" (SBNR).

 

What is the difference?

 

GENERALLY:

 

Religious = regularly participating in activities of a formal church or organization that has a set of specific doctrines expected to be accepted by members

 

Spiritual = having a sense of the meaningfulness of one's life that relates (at least vaguely) to "something greater than oneself" (this may be God (or something "God-ish"), nature, nirvana, love, "transcendence", Dao, Brahman, ...)

 

 

Among those who identify as religious or who say religion is "very important" to them, very few have strong commitments to the doctrinal claims of the denomination they belong to (many don't know what they are).

People tend to choose a church based on upbringing, convenience, or "vibe".

What may matter most to the "religious" is a conviction that certain specific (even if general) beliefs or practices are at the heart of the "important to me" judgment.

 

In contrast, the "spiritual" tend to be more agnostic about specific doctrinal claims but think "truth is in the neighborhood". They tend to consider spirituality as an individual pursuit and often see judgment of others' spirituality as inappropriate.

 

 

Many SBNR reject or may feel constricted by what they see as the "mandatoriness" of religion ("you'd better believe it or else"). Some are skeptical about the ability of human authorities or institutions to discern supramundane truths.

(Identifying as SBNR is correlated in adults with experiences of trauma, but not in adolescents.)

 

 

 

At the same time, spirituality is often motivated by belief in the limitations of human knowledge. By inductive reasoning: Our epistemic resources are both limited and imperfect. If so, then it is not unlikely that there is more to reality than these resources reveal. And if this is so, then it is not unlikely that reality might include something for which the concept of the spiritual applies.

 

 

 

Note, however, that there is some subtle implication here.

 

The claim, “It is probable that there are unknown realities” does not support the further inference that “It is probable that these are the object(s) of spirituality.”

Obviously, much depends on what “spiritual” is understood to mean.

 

Is “spiritual” compatible with naturalism (atheistic)?

[What do you think?]

 

 

If a “yes” answer is to be defended, an appropriate definition of “spiritual” is needed.

 

Based on statements from atheists: “feelings of wonder, awe, and connectedness to the universe, to other people, or to the deepest aspects of human existence.”

 

That is, naturalist spirituality is purely affective rather than cognitive (noetic).

Is this in any way a bad thing? Why would it be?

 

Rowe: “This is awe-inspiring.”

Plantinga: “God has made this.”

Is there anything WRONG with either of these views?

 

 

Mystical experience confers benefits. So does regular church attendance (people who attend church regularly tend to be healthier and live longer than people who don't. So does approaching life with “purposiveness”. So does being out in nature.

 

Naturalists think all such benefits are entirely explainable under naturalism. (For example, they may say that what matters in church attendance are the social aspects, not the religious aspects.)

They also think naturalist explanations can account for research showing that benefits tend to be stronger among the “religious” than among the “spiritual.”

 

Theist: Pr(B/T) > Pr(B/N)

Non-theist: Pr(B/T) = Pr(B/N)

 

The contrast here highlights a major point of contention in Bayesian probability: Are there rational constraints on prior probabilities (what justifies judgments of likelihood in the absence of frequentist data)?

 

Or, in foundationalist terms, what kinds of beliefs can be properly basic?

 

Or, in evidentialist terms, how do we decide whether information counts as evidence FOR a claim?

 

 

There is a connection here to a question we’ve taken up before: Why think God is personal?

 

IF God is a (supernatural) person, then God has intentions. Among his intentions is for us to believe in him. He would therefore leave “clues” in various ways. Benefits of religious beliefs, experiences, or attitudes could constitute such clues.

 

 

We’ve encountered two different defenses of religious (especially theistic) beliefs:

“Offensive” = religious beliefs are rationally superior to non-religious beliefs

“Defensive” = religious beliefs are at least no less rational than non-religious beliefs

 

People who identity as SBNR are considerably more likely to adopt the defensive stance than people who identify as religious.

 

 

Believers generally adopt the offensive stance for the following reasons:

-      Concern that unbelievers will miss out on benefits (including eternal benefits) attached to belief

-      A feeling that they are called to proselytize

-      Conviction that belief is epistemically superior to non-belief

-      Psycho-social reasons (e.g., Social Identity Theory)

-      Conviction that belief is morally superior to non-belief